

Chrysalis or butterfly?
Evaluating the significance and effectiveness
of the IBSA Dialogue Forum

David Fig

August 2010

Published by:

Biowatch South Africa

23 Acacia Road, Glenwood,
Durban 4001, South Africa

Telephone: +27 (0) 31 206 2954

Fax: +27 (0) 86 546 9196

E-mail: biowatch@mweb.co.za

www.biowatch.org.za

© 2010 Biowatch South Africa



biowatch


SOUTH AFRICA biodiversity | food security | biosafety | social justice

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	3
South-South relations – some historical perspectives	4
The emergence and functioning of IBSA	11
What is the glue that holds IBSA together?.....	14
Technological collaboration in IBSA countries.....	16
Agroenergy	16
Biotechnology and Genetically Modified Crops	20
Science and technology	23
Brief assessment.....	24
Civil society and South-South relations.....	26
Conclusions and recommendations.....	27
APPENDIX	29
Bibliography on IBSA and South-South Relations	29

Chrysalis or butterfly? Evaluating the significance and effectiveness of the IBSA Dialogue Forum

David Fig¹



Introduction

Has the IBSA Dialogue Forum served the peoples of its constituent countries? This central question will be answered by addressing a number of themes. The first of these requires the interrogation in brief outline of the broad history of South-South relations in order to locate IBSA's principal purpose: to act to improve the position of the global South in multilateral forums and power structures. The second theme will be to examine the purpose, workings and stated aspirations of IBSA and to discuss some of the challenges in forming a trilateral partnership embracing three regions of the world. Our third theme aims to examine in greater detail the workings of IBSA in relation to controversial technologies such as agrofuels, GMOs (transgenic seed and crops) and, more broadly, the field of science and technology. Finally we will return to the original question and relate it to the concerns about development as expressed especially by formations of civil society in the three countries.

In formulating their strategy towards IBSA some South African politicians likened their country's approach to a butterfly, with wings in South Asia and Latin America, but with its body in Africa. Has the butterfly emerged after seven years of collaboration, or is it still a chrysalis, having much potential but still rather dull and stagnant?

¹ Honorary Research Associate, Department of Environmental and Geographical Sciences, University of Cape Town and Chairperson, Biowatch Trust. davidfig@iafrica.com.

South-South relations – some historical perspectives

The architecture of the current international system was designed in the closing months of World War II. At that time it was foreseen that the United Nations Organisation (UN) would play the key role in conflict resolution and multilateral decision making on questions of peace, security and development. Under its predecessor, the League of Nations (1920-45), which sat in Geneva, any sovereign nation could veto League resolutions. While this was a fundamental part of “collective security”, it turned into the organisation’s Achilles heel, and ultimately destabilised international peacekeeping. In the UN system, a Security Council was created, and only the Permanent Members – the victorious allied nations of wartime: China, France, UK, USA and USSR – were permitted veto powers. This reinforced the status of the “big five” just at a time when the world was becoming more complex and diversified.

War had weakened the former colonial empires, especially of Britain and France, but also of minor powers such as the Netherlands, and it began to corrode those of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Belgium. They were all obliged to grant self-government, and later full independence, to their colonies around the world. Indonesia shook off Dutch rule soon after the end of the war. The countries of the Indian subcontinent became independent from 1947, to be followed by former French Indo-China. In Africa, the period 1956-68 saw most countries shake off colonial rule. A further wave saw the demise of the Portuguese empire in 1975. By the turn of the 21st Century, most countries around the world, barring a few minor dependencies and exceptions, had achieved sovereign independence, recognised by membership of the UN (see Appendix 2).

However the world was still divided economically. Most former colonies continued to trade with and receive investment predominantly from their former colonial masters. The economic recovery of defeated Germany and Japan, and the increasingly hegemonic position of the United States created new opportunities for economic engagement. Later, with the formation of the broader European Union and the renaissance of China, the trade picture diversified even further. However, lines of trade and investment continued predominantly on North-South lines.

The South, or what is now commonly referred to as the *global South*, was constituted mainly by history and economic status rather than by geography. Some countries of the global South are located north of the equator. What they share is a history of domination by the countries of the industrialised North. Thus they consist, with certain exceptions,² of the countries physically located in the regions of Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America with the Caribbean. Since the North was richer and more powerful militarily, after the end of colonial rule it could continue to determine conditions of trade and production that would largely disadvantage the global South. Such exceptions include Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

Conceptually the South was, until recently, known as the Third World. This term was coined in 1952 by Frenchman Alfred Sauvy,³ who was writing at the outset of the Cold War. This was a period of ideological conflict and nuclear arms race between the “West” (USA and allies) and the “East” (USSR and allies), occasionally including outbreaks of armed conflict at specific fault lines (including Greece, Korea, Vietnam, Congo, and Angola). With the West denominated as the First World, and the East as Second (hardly used), the remainder of the world, the former colonies and economically dependent territories were labelled as the Third World.⁴

² Such exceptions include Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

³ Alfred Sauvy. 1952. “Trois mondes, une planète”, *L’Observateur*. 14 August.

⁴ Vijay Prashad. 2007. *The darker nations: a biography of the short-lived Third World*. New Delhi: Leftword.

The independence struggles and new nationalist movements of the South began to think about speaking out globally with a single voice. In 1955, President Sukarno of Indonesia invited the sovereign nations of Asia and Africa to a congress at Bandung, a city at the western end of Java. The participants included mainland China, which under Mao Zedong had in 1949 expelled the nationalist regime (which nonetheless retained China's seat in the UN until the 1970s) to offshore Taiwan. At the conference, nations agreed on the importance of freeing those still under the colonial yoke, the disarmament of nuclear powers, and the strengthening of the Afro-Asian voice at the UN.⁵ Bandung was to be the first of a series of summits and conferences attended by various permutations of alliances in the global South.

The Afro-Asian summits never quite reproduced the excitement of Bandung. In 1961, however, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was founded, in Belgrade, largely under the leadership of Nehru, Nasser and Tito. Not only did this meeting include the Bandung nations, but an invitation was also extended to the nations of Latin America (whose political independence had been gained in the 19th Century) and host nation Yugoslavia (which under Tito had fallen foul of Stalin and refused to side with the USSR in international affairs). The non-aligned nations asserted that they would not be manipulated by the two sides in the Cold War; instead they argued for "devotion to the lofty cause of independence, abiding peace, social justice, and the freedom to be free" (Ahmed Sukarno, opening address, Belgrade).⁶

Despite significant expansion of the membership of the UN due to a spate of independence declarations, especially of African countries in the previous year, the nations of the South continued to be disregarded within UN debates. This was still an era in which racial discrimination abounded in the North and was enshrined in law in the settler states of Southern Africa. It was a time of aggravated world tension, especially over the fate of Berlin, which threatened to spill over into nuclear conflict. Countries of the North failed to act in abolishing apartheid, the remnants of colonial rule, and on the question of nuclear disarmament. The UN Security Council was enlarged to include more representation from newly independent countries, but the veto was not extended to them. The NAM, in the words of Amilcar Cabral, saw the UN system as "a giant with its hands tied",⁷ and continued to lobby for its democratisation.

While the NAM acknowledged that the independence struggles in certain countries could not avoid taking up arms, the central message from West and East was "peaceful coexistence", or the avoidance of violence in order not to provoke a global nuclear war. In reality, however, independence and liberation forces in numerous countries of the South found that a military solution was inevitable. These included countries like Algeria, Cuba, Congo, all the Portuguese colonies, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, and especially Vietnam. The Cuban revolution had overthrown the dictator Battista and nationalised some US-owned assets. The USA responded with an economic embargo and an attempted invasion, defeated at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, but throwing Castro increasingly into the camp of the USSR. A year later, the Soviets had armed Cuba with nuclear missiles pointed at US targets. This led to a crisis in which Kennedy and Khrushchev came close to armed conflict, but finally backed off, with a US guarantee that it would not unseat Castro. The missiles were withdrawn.

⁵ George McTurin Kahin (ed.). 1956. *The Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955*. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press; David Kimche. 1973. *The Afro-Asian movement: ideology and foreign policy of the Third World*. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press.

⁶ Prashad 2007, 321, quoting from a 1961 publication, *The Conference of the Heads of State of the Non-Aligned Countries*. Belgrade: Edition Jugoslavija, 27.

⁷ Amilcar Cabral, "National liberation and peace, cornerstones of non-alignment", in Richard Handyside (ed.). 1969. *Revolution in Guinea: selected texts by Amilcar Cabral*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 53.

Ideologically, Cuba remained supportive of armed struggles, especially against US imperialism. In this spirit it created an Organisation of Solidarity between Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAAL), also known as the Tricontinental. Castro endowed the organisation with a secretariat in Havana. The Tricontinental arranged conferences, published journals and agitated strongly in favour of a vigorous response by the South towards US foreign interventions. Around 1964-5, for example, the US had supported right-wing coups in Bolivia, Brazil, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Greece, and Indonesia, and had begun to bomb North Vietnam. Castro decided in 1966 to host in Havana the first solidarity conference of the Tricontinental. It did not confine participation to heads of state, as Bandung and NAM had done, but included national liberation movements from all three continents. Some eschewed the strategy of peacefully building UN structures, and adopted more militant approaches to fighting against neo-colonialism in the Third World. Although not a participant at the conference, Che Guevara (then in the Congo) sent a message to Havana encouraging the movement to create more anti-imperialist fronts in the world: two, three or many Vietnams. Despite this encouragement, the countries of the Tricontinental and the NAM were not in a position to take up arms for any of the liberation movements. One exception was Cuba itself, which from 1975 to 1990 assisted the survival of the MPLA government in Angola, by military and other means, principally against apartheid South African invasion. Cuba also supported Allende's Chile, the Ethiopian Dergue, the New Jewel Movement in Grenada and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. However, it did so without being able to mobilise the NAM nations – or even the rest of the Soviet bloc.

The new assertiveness of the global South had a big impact on China, which had played an important part in galvanising the Bandung conference. At first China felt uneasy about the "third way" being proposed by non-aligned countries who were distancing themselves as much from the socialist countries as the West. However, as China moved away from Soviet influence after its break with Khrushchev in 1961, it began to see for itself a greater leadership role among the countries of the global South. It revised the common understanding of the Three Worlds by redefining the hierarchy. The two greatest enemies of the South appeared to be the USA and USSR, which constituted the new First World. The Second World consisted, in its view, of Europe (east and west), Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The Third World remained the same. In reshaping its role as hostile to both superpowers, China began to seek alliances with the medium powers of the Second World, who could be useful allies of the Third World in its fundamental struggles against the superpowers but also lead China out of its isolation.

Its solidarity initiatives often resulted from its influence over pro-Beijing communist parties around the world. As such, it supported some liberation processes in Indo-China, Southern Africa, South Arabia and Palestine. In practice, however, China's international behaviour was often at odds with its claims to broader Third World solidarity – as manifested in its continued subjugation of Tibet, war with India in 1962, siding with FLN and UNITA in Angola, support for the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, and invasion of Vietnam in 1979.

On the economic front, the global South had different moments in asserting itself. The first effort took place within the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, known by its original Spanish acronym, CEPAL. There were other regional commissions set up by the UN, but CEPAL was unique. It was led by Raul Prebisch from Argentina, a former senior official in the Argentine finance ministry and later a central banker. Prebisch argued that to break Northern economic control and achieve economic development the countries of Latin America should resort to local capital formation through the use of protective tariffs for industry and the formation of commodity cartels. This strategy came to be known as import-substitution industrialisation. This idea spread from Latin America and was applied in countries like India, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and elsewhere.

A second arena for the assertion of Southern approaches to economic development occurred with the formation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This institution emerged as a counterbalance to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT was a precursor to the World Trade Organisation) which from 1947 tried to increase world trade through the progressive lowering of tariffs, a strategy that favoured the transnational corporations of the North. GATT dominated⁸ the rule making, and UNCTAD was established to promote a Southern voice and Southern alternatives.⁹ The representation of the South within UNCTAD, other sections of the UN, and the different rounds of the GATT came to be known as the Group of 77 (G77). This formation, although now with many more members, continues to exist today, frequently in alliance with China.¹⁰

The third arena took shape in proposals for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) which coalesced around the mid-1970s, and which came to be expressed in the different outputs of the Brandt Commission¹¹ and elsewhere. For some time the policy makers of the South were seduced by the possibilities of a neo-Keynesian solution to international inequality. This trend was soon to be outflanked globally by the rapid spread of an opposing neo-liberal ideology. However, while it lasted, the NIEO spoke to questions of rapid industrialisation of the South, increased South-South trade and mutual tariff reductions, the bypassing of the biased Bretton Woods institutions, free transfer of technology within the South, preference for South-based corporations over those of the North, and the establishment of development funds through taxation of trade.¹²

These proposals occurred during a brief phase in which a new wave of South-based transnational corporations had emerged, as had some important commodity cartels, principal of which was the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

In 1973, as a result of the Yom Kippur war, OPEC signalled its disapproval of the West's support for Israel by raising the price of petroleum by 400%. This created a global economic shock which saw massive inflation and simultaneous economic stagnation. For a certain period the OPEC nations and what were termed the Newly Industrialised Countries of the South (NICs) were able to assert greater power. One of the forms this took was the creation of alternative media expressing the ideology of the NIEO and promoting the interests of Third World political and economic leaders. An important expression of this was the creation in the mid-1970s of the Third World Foundation in London, which sponsored publications such as *South Magazine* and the *Third World Quarterly*. The Foundation also organised high-level conferences involving heads of state, and large media conventions. It was heavily bankrolled by the Bank for Credit and Commerce International, which exemplified the new assertive culture of South-based institutions.¹³

One important legacy of the Foundation was a conference it sponsored together with the University of Zimbabwe in 1986 on South-South co-operation. Bernard Chidzero, then the Zimbabwean finance minister, articulated the call for closer relations, seeing it as "more than a desirable object; it is a necessity". He went on to bemoan the fact that despite a number of NAM and other conferences, little progress on co-operation had been made, citing the complexity of the issues, the lack of

⁹ Diana Tussie. 1987. *The less developed countries and the world trading system*. London: Pinter.

¹⁰ Mark Williams. 1990. *Third World co-operation: the Group of 77 in UNCTAD*. London: Pinter.

¹¹ The Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Brandt Commission). 1980. *North-South: a programme for survival*. London: Pan; 1983. *Common crisis*. London: Pan; 1985. *Global challenge: from crisis to co-operation*. London: Pan.

¹² Some of these proposals had been put forward by Samir Amin in his 1976 article, "Sept propositions pour le Tiers Monde" in *Jeune Afrique*, 14 May.

¹³ "BCCI: behind closed doors", *Financial Times*, 11 November 1991, 7. By 1991-2, BCCI was mired in difficulties owing to fraudulent practices, and when it had to be liquidated, the Foundation folded.

financing mechanisms, conflicts between national and regional interests, the hegemonic interests of the North, and, uppermost, the dearth of practical political will.¹⁴

Echoing earlier iterations by Amin,¹⁵ Chidzero made practical proposals for the NIEO:

- The establishment of a Third World bank
- Collective research for social transformation
- Collaboration on development
- Collaboration on the application of science and technology
- A role for South-based NGOs in fostering South-South co-operation

Creation of a South Commission to investigate further co-operation¹⁶

It is interesting to note that some of these suggestions have been taken up by contemporary leaders such as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. For example the Union of South American States (Unasul) has established the Bank of the South, which is being capitalised by Brazil and Venezuela, to offset any reliance in the South on the World Bank.

However, the period between 1985 and 2000 was marked by failure to realise the ambitions for broad South-South collaboration raised by the proposals for an NIEO. Instead, most countries of the South faced a cycle of severe debt, collapsing currencies, the imposition of structural adjustment programmes as part of conditionality for IMF rescues, and the shrinking of the state's capacity to regulate and promote more equitable forms of economic development. These factors impeded the ability of countries of the South to invest in greater infrastructure to support mutual trade and investment. Even within the negotiations of the Uruguay round of the GATT (which resulted in the formation of the World Trade Organisation in 1994) members of the G77 were sorely divided, based on defence of national interests, and as a result, power within the WTO reflected the renewed hegemony of the North and its transnational corporations.

Within the WTO negotiations, India took a proactive stance, along with the Likeminded Group of smaller Southern economies, while Brazil and South Africa preferred to participate as part of the Cairns group of large agricultural exporting countries, and from 2003, within the G20+. At times India and Brazil have been co-opted into an inner group (G6) of dealmakers within the Doha round.¹⁷ Within the WTO, various permutations of countries of the global South have combined to assert their interests with greater degrees of success. Keet raises the question of whether it might indeed be possible for the South to move from defensive positions within the bargaining process towards proactively challenging the inequities and imbalances of the WTO itself – or, going further, seek solutions to global trade relations outside the framework of the WTO.¹⁸

Some countries of the South turned to the project of building stronger and more integrated regional and continental organisations. Examples of regional groupings include the Southern African Development Community (15 members), Mercosur (5 members and 5 associates), and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (8 members), while continental initiatives include the African Union (54 members, of which 4 suspended) and the aforementioned Union of South

¹⁴ Bernard Chidzero and Altaf Gauhar (eds). 1986. *Linking the South: the route to economic co-operation*. London: Third World Foundation, ix-x.

¹⁵ Samir Amin. 1976. 'Sept propositions pour le Tiers Monde', *Jeune Afrique*, 17 May.

¹⁶ Chidzero and Gauhar, *Linking the South*, xi.

¹⁷ Dot Keet. 2006. 'South-South' strategic challenges to the global economic system and power regime. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 11, 31.

¹⁸ Keet, 'South-South' strategic challenges, 20.

American States (12 members). Political emphasis on the regions has absorbed much of the economic and diplomatic attention of the countries of the global South.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reintegration of much of its former Eastern and Central European empire into Western political and economic structures, new emphasis has been placed on “emerging” economies. This term combines the former centrally-planned economies with what used to be called the Newly Industrialised Countries, mainly found in Asia. Some of the latter, including South Korea, Mexico, Chile, Israel and Turkey, have become full members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, the mostly-Northern club of industrialised nations. In 1994 Mexico acceded to the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and the US. The economic alignment of these Southern nations with countries of the North raises the question of their political commitment to South-South solidarity. The North has also partially co-opted a number of Southern countries into its structures, with the G8 expanding at times into the G13. The G20 (not to be confused with the grouping G20 or G20+ established within the WTO ministerial at Cancún), consisting of 19 nations and the European Union, has since 1999 been the meeting place for the central bankers and finance ministers of the member nations. About half the members represent the larger Southern economies (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey).¹⁹

The end of the bipolar world saw renewed emphasis on the Washington Consensus, the doctrine of a single globalised neo-liberal world in which capitalism proved triumphant and globally hegemonic. The retention of the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, World Bank) and the resurgence of the World Trade Organisation, have ensured that international financial architecture still largely serves the interests of the industrialised North, and particularly its business interests. Clubs like the World Economic Forum and the World Business Council on Sustainable Development have stressed the enduring culture and political reach of global corporations.

However there have been a number of chinks in the armour of the Washington Consensus.

- The rise of the counter-hegemonic global social movements, embodied in the World Social Forum, which combine international, regional and local networks, NGOs, trade unions, movements of women, indigenous people, small farmers, informal traders, shack dwellers, community organisations, campaigns and other manifestations of progressive social organisation.
- Successful campaigns to stall and halt trade deals seen as inequitable and damaging to the South, combining governments and social movements. These have ranged from the “Battle for Seattle” which disrupted ministerial trade talks in 1999, to the abandoning of the moves towards a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, and the failure of the North to effect a final agreement on the Doha round of the World Trade Organisation due to objections from dissenting governments of the South.
- An end to most dictatorships in Africa and Latin America, with renewed respect for constitutionality and human rights.
- Increasing political divisions in the North, for example, over military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- In Latin America, the emergence of a string of left-populist regimes of various political hues, sufficient to challenge the Consensus in a number of ways (nationalisations, oil deals, expressions of solidarity with other Southern countries defiant of the US such as Iran, setting up alternatives to Bretton Woods institutions).

¹⁹ See Rajiv Kumar. 2010. *A development agenda for G20: An Indian perspective*. New Delhi: Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations.

- At global level, a multipronged crisis which has adversely affected the financial sector in particular, and which requires, for its solution, a much deeper rethink about global financial architecture and regulation, including the future of the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO.

Despite enormous odds, the current conjuncture is thus somewhat favourable to the emergence of stronger collaboration across the South. New values and interests are combining to challenge the enduring hegemony of the North. Some formations such as the quadrilateral BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China), said to be emerging as the strongest economies of the future, and the trilateral IBSA Dialogue Forum (India-Brazil-South Africa), are expressions of the most recent phase of plurilateral South-South collaboration. It is to the emergence of IBSA that our attention will be focused in the section that follows.

The emergence and functioning of IBSA

The IBSA Dialogue Forum (henceforth IBSA) or G3 (as it is known in Brazil) was created in June 2003, by means of the Declaration of Brasília signed by the foreign ministers of India, Brazil and South Africa.²⁰

In 2003 final plans for the creation of IBSA were discussed at Evian by the three heads of government in a side meeting of the G8 summit. In September 2003, South African president Thabo Mbeki, Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and newly elected Brazilian president Luís Inácio da Silva (henceforth Lula, his old trade union nickname) jointly presented IBSA to the 58th session of the UN General Assembly. It was Mbeki's view, later accepted by Lula's foreign minister Celso Amorim, that IBSA should be open to the membership of China and Russia at a later stage.

The Declaration expressed the purpose of IBSA as centrally placed for trilateral co-operation within global trade talks. But it went much further than that. It foresaw the forum as playing a role in stimulating greater South-South collaboration across a range of arenas. These included the promotion of mutually identified regional and international interests, especially in the spheres of defence, trade, transport, social development, science and technology, agriculture and the environment. Multilateral diplomacy was also stressed, including changing the architecture of the UN and other multilateral institutions to reflect the emergence of the global South.

It was felt that larger coalitions of the NAM, UNCTAD and G77 type, as well as the regional organisations, played too diffuse a role in strengthening the power of the global South. It foresaw that the Dialogue would use the synergies of the three countries in a more dedicated and structured manner to make the necessary impacts.

It was important that the structures of IBSA facilitate the carrying out of a Plan of Action, rather than being another talk shop. Hence, apart from regular Summits of heads of government, there would be an annual Trilateral Commission, led by foreign ministers, and the establishment of joint working groups on particular areas of co-operation co-ordinated within the relevant line ministries. Particular countries would champion particular sub-themes in the case of agriculture. Instead of an independent secretariat, the foreign ministries would take care of logistics. This meant that the work of the organisation would be part of the normal functioning of government, rather than being channelled through separate agencies. Co-operation would therefore become programmatic, and therefore continuous, independent of the political shelf life of specific politicians.²¹

²⁰ Brazil, Ministry of External Relations. 2003. The Declaration of Brasília: Trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of Brazil, South Africa and India. Note 214, 6 June.

²¹ Chris Alden and Marco Antonio Vieira. 2005. 'The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism.' *Third World Quarterly*, 26 (7): 1089.

Table 1: Trilateral meetings of IBSA

Year	Location	Nature of meeting	Business
2003	Brasília	Foreign ministers	Founding declaration
	New York	Heads of Gov't	Presentation to UN General Assembly
2004	New Delhi	Commission 1	Agreement to double trade by 2007
2005	Cape Town	Commission 2	Framework for continuing co-operation Agreement to extend co-operation to agriculture
2006	Brasília	1st Summit	Support for conclusion of Doha round and
	Rio de Janeiro	Commission 3	Global System of Trade Preferences
2007	Pretoria	2nd Summit	
	New Delhi	Commission 4	Extend work to climate and environment
2008	New Delhi	3rd Summit	
	Somerset West	Commission 5	
2009	Brasília	Commission 6	Coordinate positions for Copenhagen climate talks
2010	Rio de Janeiro	4th Summit	IBSA-BRIC joint Business Council

Sources: Various IBSA communiqués, 2003-10

IBSA emerged at a time when both Brazil and South Africa had “normalised” their political situations after years of military dictatorship and apartheid racial oligarchy respectively. Both countries had become constitutional democracies, and could face India, the world’s largest democracy, with a collective commitment to a democratic vision. Symbolically, IBSA could thus claim to embody a common set of political values. The plan to admit China and Russia at a later stage would detract from claims that IBSA is comprised of “vibrant” democracies.

Each of the three countries faces immense problems of poverty and inequality, and employs different strategies to deal with such challenges. However, each country also has a sizeable middle class – even India, whose middle class is as large as the combined populations of Brazil and South Africa, despite its low GDP per capita (see Table 2). The three countries have all adhered to the Millennium Development Goals as a framework for tackling poverty.

The three countries are home to large corporations, relatively diversified industries, and sophisticated capital markets. Their bureaucracies are elaborate, and they possess sufficient technical policy expertise to engage strongly at international level. Each of the countries has moved

away from patterns of import-substitution industrialisation and strong state enterprises towards privatisation, more open markets and full engagement in globalisation.²²

A further claim in relation to membership is that the countries are the most significant role players in their regions in terms of economic activity, industrialisation and population size. While this claim may be correct, it also carries with it some caveats, in that other countries in the respective regions may resent the hegemonic role of the larger players. This is certainly true in the case of Brazil-Argentina and India-Pakistan, where rivalries have at times destabilised the possibilities of intraregional unity. However, with the emergence of closer regional co-operation in the southern cone of Latin America, historical rivalries have given way to closer relations.

In Southern Africa, the existence of the century-old Southern African Customs Union (linking South Africa with Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, and Swaziland) means that South Africa can no longer make trade agreements unilaterally but must involve other SACU nations; this also applies to Brazil which has to work through the Mercosur structures. SACU has already concluded a trade agreement with Mercosur, and a further agreement between India and Mercosur is in the pipeline. The result is that further formalisation of trade arrangements between IBSA partners requires them to ensure that their regional partners are also part of the deal. Trilateralism can therefore only work through mutual respect for the partners' pre-existing regional commitments, adding a certain complexity to further steps towards trade liberalisation and harmonisation of standards.

Table 2. Values and global rankings of IBSA members with respect to physical area, current and projected populations, and various economic indicators

	India		Brazil		South Africa	
Area 000km ²	3 287.0	7th	8 512.0	5th	1 226.0	25th
Population 2004	1 081.2	2nd	180.8	5th	45.2	25th
Population 2050	1 592.7	1st	244.2	7th	52.5	n/a
GDP US\$ billion (2007)	691.2	10th	604.0	14th	212.8	28th
GDP per person (US\$)	1 031	139th	8 220	60th	5 824	73rd
HDI (2009)	0.612	134th	0.813	75th	0.683	129th
Gini Coefficient (2007)	0.368		0.57		0.578	

Sources: The Economist Pocket World in Figures, 2007 edition; UN Development Program, Human Development Reports 2007/8, 2009; IMF; UN Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2008.

From the statistics presented in Table 2 it is clear that the economies of Brazil and India are around three times the size of South Africa's, and their populations are far greater. This raises the question of whether South Africa is a significant partner for the other IBSA members, and what it brings to the party. The initial argument was that each of the partners carries great weight in their respective regions and continents. Therefore South Africa was regarded as a useful "stepping stone" for the

²² Stephen Gelb. 2004. 'The IBSA Dialogue: A South African Perspective', Paper presented to a workshop on The IBSA Dialogue, global governance and development, Johannesburg, 5-8 July, 13.

other partners into Southern Africa and Africa as a whole. Whilst there is some formal logic to this, both Brazil and India have managed their own foreign relations with Africa, including trade, investment and resource extraction, without having to rely on South Africa's good offices. President Lula, since coming to office in 2003, has made four official visits to over 17 African countries (a record for a Brazilian president) and Brazil has opened 13 new embassies in Africa.

Another observation concerns the Gini co-efficient, which is the index of economic inequality within a country. The higher the co-efficient, the more unequal is the income distribution. Not only has South Africa surpassed Brazil in terms of inequality in recent years, but these two societies remain ranked amongst the most unequal in the world.

One of IBSA's key trilateral thrusts was to press for the redesign of global institutions to take the interests of the South into greater consideration. During discussions leading to the formation of the UN in 1945, US President Roosevelt had suggested to the "big 5" that Brazil be given a permanent seat in the Security Council, but this did not find favour with the other powers. Given that one indication of global status is permanent membership of the UNSC, the three IBSA countries have been staunch advocates of changing the rules to permit them to assume this function. IBSA became an advocate of this and other changes to the UN system, as well as to the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO. However, instead of pressing trilaterally for permanent membership of the UNSC, both Brazil and India have formed alliances not with South Africa but with Germany and Japan for this purpose. This side-stepping of IBSA muffles the voice of the South on this question.

Has IBSA helped to improve trade relations between the partners? White claims that between 2003 and 2008 trade within the IBSA partnership increased impressively from US\$3.9 billion to over US\$10 billion.²³ Insofar as this is off a low base, there is much room for improvement. And against Brazil-China trade of US\$43 billion in 2008, it is much less significant.

The lure for Brazil and India of the BRIC connection may, in the long term, outweigh the importance to them of IBSA. BRIC is the acronym of Brazil-Russia-India-China collaboration. The BRIC countries were identified by Jim O'Neal of Goldman Sachs in 2001 as likely to be the four most important economies of the world in the year 2050, and could supplant the G7. Compared to them, South Africa is a minnow, and the two next candidates whose economies will have earned them seats at the BRIC table have been identified as Mexico and South Korea. Whilst BRIC has not been endowed with a bureaucratic form, it has nevertheless organised two summits to date, the first in Ekaterinberg in Russia in 2009, the second in Brasília in 2010 (running back –to-back with the IBSA summit and sharing a common meeting of the two Business Forums). South Africa, although it has expressed interest in being included, has made no formal steps to do so, nor has BRIC made overtures to Pretoria. If the BRIC is likely to eclipse IBSA, will it be in South Africa's interests to press for inclusion?

What is the glue that holds IBSA together?

For the present, the IBSA project seems more systematic and focused on results, while BRIC is still a very loose arrangement rather than a formal alliance. IBSA has a strong programme of action and a plan of action to realise its agenda. Its joint working groups have met regularly to accomplish some strategic goals.

IBSA has been reinforcing bilateral and triangular relations and common actions in a number of multilateral arenas. Since coming into being there has been greater interaction by the three

²³ Lyal White. 2009. *IBSA six years on*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2.

countries in concert. This was first noticed at the 2003 WTO ministerial at Cancún, where the three countries formed part of the leadership of the G20 and later G20+. And although condemned by significant sections of civil society, the IBSA countries acted together at Copenhagen to deliver a loose and essentially minimalist agreement. There is much more scope for developing closer positions in multilateral arenas, particularly those shaping the trade and climate agendas.

The culture of collaboration, while still only seven years in the making, is maturing and is especially notable within some government departments and in the business community. The challenge will be to spread the culture through other parts of civil society. If the agenda is to be one that braces social development – and not just commercial relations – then the IBSA strategies need to encompass more on the social front. Yet it should be noticed that despite governments having impressive popular credentials in terms of emerging from liberation and trade union struggles, their policies have been much more orthodox and conservative, honouring neo-liberal ideology and privileging big business. If IBSA is to be a vehicle for collective approaches to creating more equitable societies, it will have shown a way forward for the South that is more inclusive and just.

Technological collaboration in IBSA countries

Agroenergy

The global move towards conversion of agricultural crops and biomass to energy has resulted largely from attempts by countries to become less dependent upon fossil fuels. Their motivation may be to mitigate against climate change, to become less economically dependent on petroleum imports, or to cut the costs of such imports. Agrofuels²⁴ such as ethanol and biodiesel are mostly drawn from crops such as sugar cane, maize, soya, sweet sorghum, jatropha (an oily nut), coconut, palm oil, sugar beet, sunflower and canola. Energy can also be extracted from different forms of biomass (bagasse, other crop residues, genetically modified trees, etc.). Agroenergy crops are cultivated extensively in the US and China, while the European Union has issued a directive to require the blending of its fossil fuels with renewable sources of energy such as agrofuels by the year 2020, but has insufficient land of its own to realise this objective. As a result the EU is looking to the global South to provide its future needs for agrofuels. This has led to intensified competition with the production of food crops, leading to higher food prices globally, greater hunger and insecurity, and weakening of food sovereignty across the global South.

Agrofuels are thus controversial. What is regarded by some as a quick fix for future energy demand is regarded by others as extremely problematic. Most critics point to the food/fuel conflict involving key crops such as maize, sugar, soya and palm oil, but they also note the expansion of the agrofuels frontier into crucial carbon dioxide sinks such as the Amazon and the rainforests of south-east Asia. The expansion of sugar plantations, for example, compromises water-scarce areas, because each kilogram of sugar requires seven litres of water for its cultivation. The search for arable land for the cultivation of agrofuels (especially to meet EU requirements for blending) has led to unseemly land grabs in the South. Often the planting of monocultures to meet these needs has a negative environmental impact, due to the required massive use of organophosphates and other lethal herbicides and pesticides. Most crop energy is produced for sale abroad, and may not be part of a strategy to reduce energy poverty locally. In terms of poverty alleviation, it is also well known that labour conditions on sugar plantations are dire, and wages low, leading to sugar being deemed a “hunger crop”.²⁵

²⁴ The terminology used here prefers the prefix ‘agro-’ to denote that these fuels are provided by agricultural activities. It is preferred to the prefix ‘bio-’ (Greek for ‘life’) which may be misinterpreted by some into thinking that the fuels have some kind of biological mandate, i.e., are life-affirming, or are ecologically sound. This distinction has been proposed by La Via Campesina and some of its constituent social movements in Latin America, such as the Brazilian Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST).

²⁵ Network for Social Justice and Human Rights (RSJDH) and Pastoral Land Commission (CPT). 2007. *Agroenergy: myths and impacts in Latin America*. São Paulo and Recife: RSJDH/CPT. Also see Sofia Monsalve Suárez (ed.) 2008. *Agrofuels in Brazil*. Heidelberg: FIAN International.




Fig. 1. Current biofuel technologies

Source: IFP Panorama. 2007. Biofuels in Europe. Downloaded from IFP-Panorama07-06-Biocarburants_Europe_VA[1].pdf, on 22 August 2010.

Brazil has by far the longest record of producing ethanol as a motor vehicle fuel. At first the motivation was the oil shocks of 1973, when world petroleum prices were quadrupled overnight. Since 1975, ethanol has been available for both blending and neat use. Originally ethanol production was subsidised through the Proálcool programme, and the price capped at 59% of the petrol price. In 1980 all-ethanol vehicles began to be produced, and by 1985 they had taken over 75% of the market for new cars. Government support ensured that ethanol production reached 12.3 billion tonnes by 1987. In 1985 petroleum prices began to decline on world markets and the government ran out of funds to provide further subsidies. Ethanol production stagnated, and many cars were stranded without fuel until imports made up for the shortfall. Price controls were removed, and the market for all-ethanol cars dried up to around 1% of the new cars, with people switching to flex-fuel cars (cars that mixed petrol and ethanol in flexible ratios). From 2001 onwards sugar harvests again increased, and by 2009 ethanol demand was met from domestic production.²⁶

The expansion of soya production led to the adoption by the Brazilian government in 2005 of an agrodiesel programme with soya as the main feedstock. From January 2010 it has become mandatory in Brazil to blend an amount of 5% of agrodiesel. This is of immense benefit to the large-scale agribusiness corporations, as is the rise in soya oil prices from US\$306 per ton in 2001 to US\$1 343 per ton in 2008.²⁷

²⁶ José Roberto Moreira. 2010. 'Brazilian perspectives on the development of clean energy', Paper presented to a multi-country research dialogue on Emerging Economies in the New World Order: Promises, Pitfalls and Priorities, New Delhi, 12-13 April, 10-14.

²⁷ Suárez (ed.). 2008. *Agrofuels in Brazil*, 7.

The Brazilian government strongly backs the production and use of agrofuels, presenting them as an answer not only to the energy crisis, but also to problems of climate and hunger. It rejects the notion that agrofuel crops compete with food crops and place them at risk.²⁸ Not only has Brazil sought to export agrofuel technology and knowhow, but appropriate finance packages and programmes are also being developed by its institutions to certify the ecological sustainability of agrofuels. Much of Lula's international diplomatic thrusts in Africa stress the importance of agrofuels and the need for African countries to accept Brazilian expertise and investment in this area.

Table 3 Ethanol production by IBSA country, 2004-9

million US gallons	2004	2007	2009
Brazil	3989	5019,2	6577,89
India		52,8	91,67
South Africa	[110 ⁱ]	n/a	n/a

Sources: US. Department of Energy. 2007. *Biomass Energy Data Book, World Fuel Ethanol Production by Country or Region*, Table 2.3; Earth Policy Institute. 2005. Ethanol production examples worldwide. Downloaded from www.earth-policy.org/Updates/2005/Update49_data.htm on 25 August 2007;

While much smaller in extent, India's production of ethanol is the fourth largest in the world, and India is set on a path to produce agrodiesel from jatropha in the near future.²⁹ India's diesel consumption is four times that of petrol, and government is busy implementing an ambitious National Biodiesel Mission whose aim is to have a 20% agrodiesel blend by 2011-12.³⁰ India usually produces enough ethanol for domestic requirements, but when it falls short it has been known to import ethanol from Brazil.³¹

In the case of South Africa, extensive production of ethanol and agrodiesel has not yet occurred, although the country has a significant sugar industry and is involved in the growing of suitable feedstock for agrofuels. There is a lobby for agrofuels, but in 2009 it was reported that there was still no workable project from virgin feedstock, despite plans, policy papers and public workshops; "[agro]fuels continue to flounder in a morass of government inaction, lack of policy determination, and the threat to food security."³²

In 2007 the government produced the first policy document on agrofuels.³³ Despite there being elaborate plans in the private sector for the production of ethanol from maize, the policy took into account the public concerns over fuel/food competition, and rejected the use of maize, a staple food across Southern Africa, as a feedstock for agrofuels. Similarly the policy document rejected the use

²⁸ Speaking at an FAO conference in Brasilia in April 2008, Brazilian President Lula claimed that allegations that global food prices were rising because of biofuels were baseless. "Biofuels aren't the villain that threatens food security. On the contrary... they can pull countries out of energy dependency without affecting foods. Food prices were going up", he said, "because people in developing countries like China, India and Brazil itself were simply eating more as their economic conditions improved." Emilio San Pedro, *BBC News*, 18 April 2008 available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7351766.stm>, downloaded on 20 August 2010.

²⁹ Joseph C Gonsalves. 2006. *An assessment of the biofuels industry in India* (UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2006/6). Geneva: UN Conference on Trade and Development.

³⁰ India, Government of. Planning Commission. 2003. *Report of the committee on development of biofuel*. New Delhi: Planning Commission.

³¹ For example, in 2004, it imported 447 million litres from Brazil. See Gonsalves. *An assessment of the biofuels industry in India*, 38.

³² Dirk Esterhuysen. 2009. 'South Africa biofuels annual report.' *GAIN Report*, US Department of Agriculture. 28 May: 2. For the lobby's website see South African Bioenergy Association at www.saba.za.org.

³³ South Africa. Department of Minerals and Energy (DME). 2007. *Biofuels industrial strategy for the Republic of South Africa*. Pretoria: DME.

of jatropha for agrodiesel, accepting the argument put forward by conservationists that the plant would be an invasive alien species and rebound negatively upon South Africa's vulnerable biodiversity.

Nevertheless various plans are going ahead for agrofuel production in six of South Africa's nine provinces, including biodiesel from canola, soya and sunflower, and ethanol from sugar cane, sugar beet, cassava (manioc) and sweet sorghum.³⁴ Most projects, including the building of refineries, will only come on stream from 2011, and thus far production figures are still in the realm of planning and speculation. South Africa's representation at IBSA on this matter is through the Agricultural Research Council, which falls under the Department of Science and Technology.

In IBSA, agrofuels were clearly identified as an issue for collaboration in a number of working groups, including those for energy and climate change. This led in September 2006 to the formulation of a Memorandum of Understanding on Biofuels,³⁵ which aimed to create a trilateral task force to promote the use of ethanol and bio-diesel as vehicular fuel to increase energy security.³⁶

Given these opportunities for collaboration, it is very hard to understand that Brazil seeks to propel its ethanol diplomacy through bypassing the IBSA structures:

- On 9 March 2007 President Lula signed a Memorandum of Understanding with US President George W Bush on promoting greater co-operation on ethanol and other agrofuels in the Western Hemisphere.³⁷
- On 14 July 2010 Brazil formed a coalition with the European Union with the aim of providing development assistance on agrofuels to Mozambique.³⁸
- Brazil has promoted ethanol production in Africa and Lula has made a series of visits to African countries.

In all these moves, IBSA has failed to feature. Brazil clearly has no need of an intermediary like South Africa through which to broker relationships with other countries on the African continent. Brazil is able to make direct moves in Africa without the need for intermediaries, trading on its Lusophonic heritage and other historic links, particularly with West Africa. Furthermore, alliances on agrofuels with the US and the EU mean that Brazil is favouring South-North networking over a strictly South-South strategy.

Thus in the field of agroenergy it is difficult to see any decisive impact of the IBSA process so far. The three national departments of energy have committed to drafting an action plan, which might galvanise the trilateral task force on agrofuels in future.

³⁴ South Africa. Department of Minerals and Energy (DME). 2007. *Biofuels industrial strategy for the Republic of South Africa*. Pretoria: DME.

³⁵ Lyal White and Tatania Cyro Costa. 2009. *Biofuel technology transfer in IBSA: lessons for South Africa and Brazil*. Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Affairs, 1.

³⁶ V S Chandrasekar and Devidas Gupta. 2006. 'Bring perpetrators of Mumbai blast to justice: IBSA', *Outlook India*, 14 September, available at <http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?415495>, accessed on 23 August 2010.

³⁷ The countries agreed to advance (1) research and development bilaterally, (2) help to build domestic biofuels industries in third countries, and (3) work multilaterally to advance the global development of agrofuels. See US. State Department. Office of the Spokesman. 2007. *Memorandum of understanding between the United States and Brazil to advance co-operation on biofuels*. Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/mar/81607.htm> accessed on 23 August 2010. Also see Clare Ribando Seelke and Brent D Yacobucci. 2007. *Ethanol and other biofuels: potential for US and Brazil energy co-operation*. Washington: US, Congressional Research Service.

³⁸ Lauren van der Westhuizen. 2010. 'Brazil, EU hook up in Mozambique', *Business Day*, 3 August. Available at <http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=116858>, accessed on 24 August 2010.

Biotechnology and Genetically Modified Crops

Within a brief period of years there has been a notably extensive uptake of transgenic crops by the IBSA countries (see Table 4).

Table 4 GMO planting by country, area and crops, 2009

Country	Area in million hectares	GM crops cultivated
USA	64	Soya, maize, cotton, canola, sugar beet, squash, papaya
Brazil	21,4	Soya, maize, cotton
Argentina	21,3	Soya, maize, cotton
India	8,4	Cotton
Canada	8,2	Canola, maize, soya, sugar beet
China	3,7	Cotton, poplar, papaya, tomato, sweet pepper, petunia
Paraguay	2,2	Soya
South Africa	2,1	Maize, soya, cotton

Note: All other countries plant less than 1 million hectares.

Source: GMO Compass, downloaded at http://www.gmo-compass.org/eng/agri_biotechnology/gmo_planting/257.global_gm_planting_2009.html, accessed on 25 August 2010.

However, the Brazilian and South African governments, in succumbing to policies supporting the growing and distribution of genetically-modified (GM) crops, have, in general, privileged the interests of large-scale agribusiness, despite public outcries. They have allowed in their countries the rapid monopolisation of ownership of seed companies in the hands of foreign transnational corporations such as Monsanto, Syngenta, Pannar and Bayer.

In **Brazil** President Lula went back on pre-election commitments to keeping Brazil free of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). States such as Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná tried to keep GMOs out, but with smuggling of Monsanto Roundup Ready soya from across the border with Argentina, and with changes in government policy favouring the use of GMOs, their efforts to implement a moratorium were in vain. Brazil legalised the use of GM soya in 2005, and is now one of the world's largest producer of soya, two-thirds of which is transgenic.

Bt cotton is the only other GM crop approved for commercial cultivation. Despite this approval, the Ministry of the Environment, as well as NGOs, continue to oppose the planting because of the possibility of crossing with indigenous cotton species.

In February 2007, the Sao Paulo-based Cane Technology Centre (CTC) obtained approval for field trials of three varieties of GM sugar cane, modified to exhibit sucrose levels 15% higher than normal. It was expected that these could be commercialised by 2010.³⁹

In 2008, Brazil's National Council for Biosafety gave permission for the planting of two varieties of GM maize.⁴⁰

India is the world's largest cotton producer. By 2006, 39% of the Indian cotton crop was made up of GMOs. GM cotton was not cultivated in Northern India, but even in Southern India the state of Kerala forbade its cultivation on the grounds that it has posed a threat to biodiversity. Kerala's chief minister, V S Achuthanandan stated that GM foods would lead to the "colonisation of the food sector. We should not be part of a system that will destroy traditional seeds and allow [transnational corporations] to infringe on the agriculture sector." This was said in the context of an application for approval of the commercial release of Bt brinjal (aubergine/eggplant)⁴¹. Brinjal is a vegetable which has widespread use in Indian cooking. In February 2010, the government rejected Monsanto's application.

Shiva and other critics have pointed to the failure of Bt cotton in India in terms of yield, impact on pests, and the social impact of foisting debt onto many small farmers whose crops fail and who commit suicide as a result.⁴²

South Africa's regulators have allowed the commercial release of GM white maize, yellow maize, soya and cotton. In addition, field trials for potatoes, tomatoes, canola, apples, honey and "super" sorghum have also been sanctioned. With the first introduction of GM crops in South Africa having taken place in 1996, there are claims that in 2010 62% of all maize, 80% of all soya and 90% of all cotton are now transgenic.⁴³ Maize is a staple food for most of South Africa's 50 million people. In 2009, it was reported that three varieties of Monsanto GM maize failed to seed properly over 82 000 hectares. A minimum of 280 farmers (out of 1000 who cultivated the varieties) had to be compensated.⁴⁴ Monsanto also attempted in 1999 to provide small farmers with Bt cotton, the first such small growers' scheme in Africa, in the Makathini flats area. At first the results involved greater yields and lower use of pesticides, however the farmers found that over a number of growing seasons pest resistance increased; they fell increasingly into debt, and the scheme had to be abandoned.

Monsanto has also linked up with the government of the Eastern Cape province, South Africa's poorest, to provide free seed for what was called a Massive Food Production Programme. This also failed, owing to weak provision of extension and other services. The programme had been

³⁹ Reuters. 2008. 'Brazil gives final permit for GMO corn varieties.' 13 February. Downloaded from http://greenbio.checkbiotech.org/news/brazil_gives_final_permit_gmo_corn_varieties, accessed on 24 August 2010.

⁴⁰ GMO Compass. 2007. 'Are GMOs fuelling the Brazilian future?', 8 March. Downloaded from http://www.gmocompass.org/eng/news/stories/273.gmos_fuelling_brazilian_future.html, accessed on 26 August 2010.

⁴¹ Jason Burke. 2010. 'India to rule on future of aubergine as country's first genetically modified food.' *The Guardian*, 8 February.

⁴² Dr Vandana Shiva and Afsar H Jafri. 2004. 'Failure of GMOs in India.' *Synthesis/Regeneration* 33 (Winter). Downloaded from <http://www.greens.org/s-r/33/33-04.html>, accessed on 27 August 2010. The early history of GMO firms in India can be found in Peter Newell. 2003. *Biotech firms, biotech politics: negotiating GMOs in India* (IDS Working Paper 201). Brighton: Institute for Development Studies.

⁴³ African Centre for Biosafety (ACB). 2010. The monitoring of environmental impacts of GMOs in South Africa: a status quo report (ACB Briefing 13). Johannesburg: ACB.

⁴⁴ Food First. 2009. 'Monsanto genetically modified corn harvest fails massively in South Africa.' 22 July. Downloaded from <http://www.foodfirst.org/en/node/2504>, accessed on 27 August 2010.'

implemented in the spirit of developing a new “green revolution” among Africa’s small farmers. All over the continent the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is supporting Monsanto and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, ostensibly to bring about higher yields and to commercialise small farming, but the scheme also ties farmers into dependency on GMO seed and unaffordable inputs from large corporations.⁴⁵

Can it be said that there has been collaboration on GMOs within **IBSA**? The documentary record looks unpromising to date.

The IBSA memorandum of understanding on agriculture is somewhat hollow on the question of content, and does not refer directly to GMOs. In Article 3 (“Areas of co-operation”) it lists as its four common areas of interest:

- Research and technical capacitation
- Trade in agricultural products, including sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues
- Rural development and poverty alleviation

Any other issues agreed to by the parties⁴⁶

In the 2007 New Delhi ministerial communiqué, this had been expanded to the following agricultural issues, with sub-groups being formed to realise projects within each of them:

- Animal health and animal production
- Biofuels in the context of agriculture
- Sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues
- Agro-processing and agro-business
- Research and capacity building
- Policy identification of joint projects⁴⁷

In a document tabled at the sixth meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Brasília in June 2010, acknowledging the last of these issues, co-operation is referred to largely in the future tense. For example, there is reference to “potential areas for future agriculture co-operation in IBSA” and this lists the following areas: food processing, food safety measures (mainly sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues in agricultural trade), promotion of joint agricultural research and development (R&D), application of information and communication technologies for agricultural development and capacity building, and the exchange of human resources.⁴⁸

Under the question of joint R&D, the following is stated:

India, Brazil and South Africa have developed significant technological capabilities in different fields of agricultural research. Joint research on products of common interest and exchange of their genetic resources could be attempted. IBSA co-operation should facilitate in taking these capabilities to new heights for the benefit of the farming communities in these countries. New issues are emerging (for instance climate change,

⁴⁵ See Anurhada Mittal and Melissa Moore (eds). 2008. *Voices from Africa: African farmers and environmentalists speak out against a new green revolution in Africa*. Oakland: Oakland Institute.

⁴⁶ IBSA Dialogue Forum. 2006. *Memorandum of understanding on agriculture and related issues*. Brasilia: Itamaraty, 13 September, 3.

⁴⁷ IBSA Dialogue Forum. 2007. *New Delhi ministerial communiqué*. New Delhi: Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 7.

⁴⁸ IBSA Dialogue Forum. 2010. *Future of agricultural co-operation in India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA)*, 15 April, 2-3.

emergence of GMO crops, increasing role of biotechnology and nanotechnology), which may have far-reaching implications in the agricultural sector. A common strategy for tackling such issues may be developed. An IBSA fund for promoting joint R&D could be set up to initiate such activities.⁴⁹

From this statement it can be concluded that IBSA has not yet been utilised as a vehicle for joint collaboration on GMO crops, which are only being flagged for vague future trilateral co-operation. In referring to GMOs as a “new issue”, the statement seems a little naïve. What can be reported is a seminar on biosafety held under the auspices of the Science and Technology Working Group.⁵⁰

Science and technology

Perhaps it is in the sphere of science and technology that IBSA’s working groups have made most progress.

Science and technology co-operation was stressed in IBSA’s Brasília Declaration of 2003:

Amongst the scientific and technological areas in which co-operation can be developed are biotechnology, alternative energy sources, outer space, aeronautics, information technology and agriculture.⁵¹

What actually emerged after the establishment of a joint working group on science and technology was a division of labour for the sub-groups with each country leading two of the sub-groups. Three were linked to the combatting of major diseases through medical research and the development of medical technologies. The sub-topic of Antarctica has also been added to the list and linked to the theme of oceanography.

Table 5 Lead countries in IBSA’s science and technology sub-areas of research

Area of research	Lead country
HIV/AIDS	India
Tuberculosis	South Africa
Malaria	Brazil
Nanotechnology	India
Biotechnology	South Africa
Oceanography	Brazil

Source: Chevalier, Romy *et al.* 2008. “India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA): a new geography of trade and technology cooperation?” *Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie* 52 (1): 46.

In 2009, further research sub-areas were added after the IBSA Summit, namely: information and communications technology, food security, astronomy/astrophysics, and renewable energy.

Dr Thomas auf der Heyde, deputy director-general of science and technology, responsible for international affairs in the South African Department of Science and Technology (DST), in an extensive interview in March 2010, commented that there had been renewed vigour and a

⁴⁹ IBSA Dialogue Forum. 2010. Future of agricultural co-operation, 3.

⁵⁰ Keith Campbell. 2010. ‘IBSA R&D progressing but unevenly’, *Engineering News*, 15 August.

⁵¹ IBSA Dialogue Forum. 2003. *Brasília Declaration*. Brasília: Ministry of External Relations, Clause 9.

reassessment of strategic science and technology links within IBSA over the previous 2-3 years. Both Brazil and India want the space for collaboration with South Africa on science and technology to grow, both bilaterally and within IBSA. At first, claimed Auf der Heyde, the diplomacy over science and technology was linked more strongly to economic diplomacy, but a new kind of momentum has emerged, recognising a broader strategic engagement. Trilateral priorities include nanotechnology, biotechnology (including agrofuels), and a joint conceptual framework on innovation. A raft of practical modalities to implement these have included joint research programmes, scientific exchanges, conferences, summer schools, setting up calls for research, and policy dialogues. Obstacles included limitations on funding (each country has put forward US\$1 million for trilateral S&T research), identifying mutual priorities and creating a practical framework for collaboration, which could take another 5-8 years. South Africa sees its role in IBSA as providing some of the conceptual leadership, especially on areas such as innovation. Its science system is small enough to understand at an intimate level, yet large and productive enough to be able to measure benefits.⁵²

DST staffers responsible for relations with IBSA reported that although no concrete projects had yet been completed there had been engagement in the form of various workshops. For example, the first nanotechnology “schools” had taken place in Brazil and India, grooming postgraduate students to link with scientists from the three countries. South Africa had also allocated R3,5 million (US\$475 000) to host IBSA calls for research over the next three years. All this indicates that IBSA is growing and dynamic within the sphere of science and technology.⁵³

Brief assessment

Functional collaboration on specific themes, such as those raised above, is really in its infancy within IBSA, despite the Dialogue Forum having completed seven years of its existence. Some small steps have been taken, but within a highly bureaucratised framework, and without setting up common and realisable policy goals. While intentions may be there, these have seldom been matched by significant action.

On agro-energy, local initiatives are on different scales utilising different feedstocks. There has not been any privileging of IBSA partners, any serious technological exchanges or transfers, any common plan on how to relate to the questions of regulation, exports, or sustainability. Instead of working through IBSA or South Africa, Brazil has, for example, preferred to partner with the EU in its efforts to work with Mozambique on agroenergy.

Similarly on GMOs, there is yet to be any policy harmonisation or common stances. India seems to have a much more precautionary approach to the uptake of GMOs, while South Africa and Brazil have been extremely liberal in meeting the needs of the transnational GM corporations, despite the potential negative impact on their mega- and agro-biodiversity. Thus a common trilateral posture may be difficult to forge.

Finally on broad approaches to science and technology, there has been some initial movement, but once again, there is more potential than specific results. India and Brazil have very large science establishments, and South Africa would need to punch above its weight in order to add value to what can be achieved trilaterally.

⁵² Dr Thomas auf der Heyde, Deputy Director-General, International Affairs, Department of Science and Technology, South Africa. Interview, Johannesburg, 6 March 2010.

⁵³ Ms Pankah Mdaka, Director for the Americas and Asia, and Ms Portia Raphasha, IBSA Nodal Representative, both in the Department of Science and Technology, South Africa. Interview, Pretoria, 16 March 2010.

Can IBSA achieve more than the sum of healthy bilateral relations between the three countries? The following section raises the issue of whether inclusion of a broader civil society component could improve IBSA's potentialities.

Civil society and South-South relations

The IBSA Dialogue Forum makes provision for a Business Forum and a Women's Forum. These sometimes meet in parallel with IBSA Summits. For example, the Business Forum was included in the programme of the fourth summit in Brasília in 2010. The IBSA meetings were held back-to-back with the BRIC meetings, and a joint dinner was arranged for the Business Forums of the two organisations on the connecting evening.

The rest of civil society has never been invited to participate, either within the structures or on the margins of key meetings.

Clearly, one of IBSA's goals is to enhance trade between the three partners, and its Business Forum constitutes a network for doing so. One of IBSA's chief concerns is also to improve conditions for the South in the rules and practices of international trade. This devotion to the sphere of international trade frequently sets up the interests of corporate business as being the same as the national interest, when often the national interest is a much broader platform which should reflect the interests of a wider range of stakeholders.

IBSA has been the object of research and concern of a number of think tanks, academic researchers, development organisations, and other non-governmental groups. Civil society from each of the three countries has had a long history of interactions with its counterparts, and this often predates inter-governmental relations. Many such bodies have developed and shared their expertise across the three countries in areas like trade, energy, environment, fighting poverty and crime, housing, urban planning and so forth. This extensive legacy seems to find no place within the normal structures of IBSA. Policy dialogues are not taking into account the wealth of experience which may be available in civil society organisations. This raises the problem that IBSA remains an inter-governmental project rather than one which can claim ownership by the people of the three countries as a whole. There is a danger that the project may be rendered too remote from a popular base at a policy level.

The question for civil society organisations is whether to seek to reform the structures in order to make them more responsive to a popular agenda, or to confront them from outside. Many civil society organisations question the development model on which the respective national policies on agroenergy, GMOs, and large-scale high-input monocrop export-based agriculture are based. The IBSA Dialogue Forum is not likely to provide the political space for the challenging of this model; instead it aims to promote it unquestioningly. Until that political space becomes available, it is more likely that civil society organisations will choose to challenge these values from outside the structures.

It is important, however, that civil society organisations from the IBSA countries be supported in their joint efforts to work for better policy in their respective countries and trilaterally. This would enable them to maintain a critique of the Dialogue Forum, and to call for a more responsive and inclusive set of structures that promote trilateralism and a more popular South-South perspective. As this begins to take shape, we could term it a "People's IBSA" or an "IBSA from below".

Conclusions and recommendations

With the end of Lula's presidency scheduled for October 2010, the last of the original champions of the IBSA Dialogue Forum leaves the political stage. It will be interesting to see whether IBSA's political momentum is maintained, or whether most of the efforts of Brazil and India are folded into BRIC. South Africa has expressed interest in joining BRIC, but may continue to be left out on the grounds that its population and economy do not match those of other BRIC members. Meanwhile BRIC is a looser, less bureaucratic structure than IBSA, which may mean it can intervene more readily to represent its members. Unlike South Africa, these may become the most important national economies at mid-century, as Goldman Sachs has predicted.

IBSA has, since Cancún, not been such a strong vehicle to organise the interests of the South in the Doha round of the World Trade Organisation. This round has lost most of its impetus, and proposals to go forward are not being produced by IBSA countries acting in tandem in a leadership role.

IBSA no longer represents the radical rise of the South in global politics. This mantle of the Nkrumahs, Sukarnos and Nassers has perhaps been snatched up by the new coalition of Latin American nations including Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. For example, with the failure of the 16th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change at Copenhagen in December 2009, a counter-conference was organised in Cochabamba by the Bolivian government. IBSA governments had supported the weak accord coming out of the Copenhagen meeting.

At the same time, IBSA is not the vehicle being used by its members to support reform of the United Nations Security Council. Brazil and India are instead working with Germany and Japan. South Africa is reluctant to be seen as lobbying outside the framework of the Africa group in the UN.

Trilateral trade has increased significantly during the short life of IBSA, but pales when compared with bilateral trade between individual members and China.

To date, the legacy of joint projects has been a weak one. One of the projects involves providing development aid to four countries in the South, such as Guinea-Bissau, the Palestinian authority, Haiti and Timor-Leste. IBSA member-countries are each said to be putting up US\$1 million a year to fund this programme. However, they rely on the United Nations Development Programme functioning as the implementing agency, so it is not clear whether the aid is being branded as coming from IBSA countries.

While some dividend may result from exchanges, joint research and joint projects, no attempt is being made at trilateral policy integration. Individual countries – especially Brazil and South Africa – have greater commitments to policy integration within their respective regions. Trade agreements have, to date, been organised bilaterally and on an inter-regional basis, rather than utilising the IBSA framework.

The IBSA Dialogue Forum is likely, therefore, to remain in essence a consultative body, which to extend its coherence has established some collaborative programmes. It does not really play a role as spokesperson for the global South, nor is it essentially involved in producing a coherent South position on key global issues such as UN reform, the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals, or the combating of global poverty, inequality and injustice.

Since it is unlikely to promote the values of its national civil society organisations in key spheres like energy, climate, environment and agriculture, the IBSA Dialogue Forum will not be in a position to put forward a new global vision for sustainability and planetary justice. Its summits and ministerial

consultations may, however, provide a focal point for civil society from the three nations to put forward their shared alternative vision through co-ordinated actions and interventions.

The chrysalis remains dormant, in need of its metamorphosis.

APPENDIX

Bibliography on IBSA and South-South Relations

- Alden, Chris and Marco Antonio Vieira (2005). "The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism." *Third World Quarterly*, 26 (7): 1077-1095.
- Amin, Samir (1976). "Sept propositions pour le Tiers Monde", *Jeune Afrique*, 17 May.
- Antkiewicz, A. and J. Whalley (2006): "BRICSAM and the non-WTO." *Review of International Organizations*, 1 (3): 237-261.
- Avramovic, D. (1988). "South-South co-operation: challenges and opportunities." Pp. 15-48 in: Singer, Hans W., N. Hatti, N. and R. Tandon. (eds). *Challenges of South-South cooperation*. New Delhi: Ashish.
- Aykut, D. and D. Ratha (2003). "South-South flows: How big are they?" *Transnational Corporations* 13 (1): 149-176.
- Blindheimsvik, Katrine (2009). Is the whole greater than its components? : a new regionalist analysis of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) dialogue forum. Unpublished MA, Department of International Politics, University of South Africa.
- Brazil Institute (2009). *Emerging powers: India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) and the future of South-South relations*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- Burges, Sean W (2005). "Auto-estima in Brazil: the logic of Lula's South-South policy", *International Journal* 60 (4): 1133-1151.
- Campos, Taiane and Luciana Las Casas (2009). "Similar roles, different strategies: Brazil, India and South Africa trade policies." Paper presented at the 50th annual convention of the International Studies Association, New York.
- Chakraborty, Debashis and Dipankar Sengupta (2006). *IBSAC (India, Brazil, South Africa, China): A potential developing country coalition in WTO negotiations*. (Occasional Paper 18). New Delhi: Centre des Sciences Humaines.
- Chetty, Tamaraveni (2006). "Factors influencing the success of ethanol production for use in liquid transport fuels in South Africa." MBA dissertation, Gordon Institute for Business Science, University of Pretoria.
- Chevallier, Romy (2008). "IBSA and global issues: Emerging powers and the future of the global climate change regime." Paper presented at conference on New directions in the South? Assessing the importance and consequences of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) to International Relations, IUPERJ, Rio de Janeiro.
- Chevallier, Romy, Christian von Drachenfels and Andreas Stamm (2008). "India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA): a new geography of trade and technology cooperation?" *Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie* 52 (1): 35-49.
- Davies, Rob.2010. "The importance of Brazil, India and China for South Africa." *New Agenda* 38 (2): 8-12.
- De, Prabir (2005). *Trade in IBSA economic cooperation: The role of transport linkages* (Discussion Paper 104). New Delhi: Research and Information System for Developing Countries.
- Deere, Carolyn and Ngaire Woods (2004), "Global governance reform: challenges and opportunities for IBSA." Paper presented at a workshop on the IBSA Dialogue, Global Governance and Development, Johannesburg, 5-6 July.
- De Oliveira, Amâncio Jorge Nunes, Janina Onuki and Emmanuel de Oliveira (2006). "Coalizões Sul-Sul e multilateralismo: Índia, Brasil e África do Sul." *Contexto Internacional* 28 (2): 465-504.
- Dirlik, Arif (2007). "Global South: predicament and promise", *The Global South* 1 (1): 12-23.

- Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana (2006). "Address during the opening session of the 3rd IBSA ministerial trilateral commission." *UNISA Latin America Report* 22 (1 & 2): 131-134.
- Draper, Peter, Greg Mills and Lyal White (2004). *Much ado about something? Assessing the potential of the India-Brazil-SA Forum* (SAIIA Report 46). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Du Preez, [Mari-Lise](#) (2007). *Is three a crowd or a coalition ? : India, Brazil and South Africa in the WTO*. Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Stellenbosch.
- Fan, Qimiao, Andrew Beath, Kathrin Frauscher, Michael Jarvis and José Guilherme Reis (2008). *The investment climate in Brazil, India, and South Africa : a comparison of approaches for sustaining economic growth in emerging economies*. Washington: World Bank.
- Fig, David (1979). "The South Atlantic connection: growing links between South Africa and Latin America," Pp. 90-128 in Jan Karmali (ed.) *Britain and Latin America: an annual review of British-Latin American relations*. London: Latin America Bureau.
- Fig, David (1992). "The political economy of South-South relations: the case of South Africa and Latin America." Ph D dissertation, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Flemes, Daniel (2007). *Emerging middle powers' soft balancing strategy: state and perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum* (Working Paper 57). Hamburg; German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
- Fonseca, R., M. S. Azevedo and E. Velloso (2005). *Trade potential between Brazil and India: an examination based on comparative advantage structures* (CNI Studies 1). Brasília: Confederação Nacional da Indústria.
- Fugazza, M. and M. Vanzetti (2006). *A South-South survival strategy: the potential for trade among developing countries*. (UNCTAD Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series 33). Geneva: UNCTAD.
- Gelb, Stephen (2004). "The IBSA Dialogue: a South African perspective." Paper presented at a workshop on the IBSA Dialogue, Global Governance and Development, Johannesburg, 5-6 July.
- Giaccaglia, Clarisa (2009). "India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) and the challenges of the international system: revisionist middle powers? The case of biofuels." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA - ABRI Joint International Meeting, Pontifical Catholic University (PUC-RJ), Rio de Janeiro.
- Grant, Catherine (2006). *Developing a comprehensive IBSA strategy on WTO agricultural negotiations* (Trade policy report 11). Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Affairs.
- Group of 77 (G77)(2000): *Havana Programme of Action*. South Summit 10-14 April 2000, Havana. (available at <http://www.nam.gov.za/documentation/southact.htm#KNOWLEDGE%20AND%20TECHNOLOGY>, downloaded 7 January 2008).
- Heine, Jorge, Greg Mills and Ian Porter (eds). (1998). *Looking sideways: the specifics of South-South co-operation*. Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Affairs.
- Hirst, Monica (2009). *An overview of Brazilian foreign policy in the 21st century* (SAIIA Emerging Powers Programme, Policy Brief 6). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Hurrell, Andrew (2006). "Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?" *International Affairs*, 82, 1-19.
- IBSA Dialogue Forum (2003), *Brasília Declaration: South Africa-Brazil-India joint communiqué*. Brasília: Ministry of External Relations.

- IBSA Dialogue Forum (2004). *New Delhi Agenda for Co-operation*. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs.
- IBSA Dialogue Forum (2006), *Memorandum of understanding on trilateral co-operation on trilateral agricultural and related issues between the governments of Brazil, South Africa and India in the ambit of the IBSA Dialogue Forum*. Brasilia: Ministry of External Affairs (Itamaraty), 13 September.
- IBSA Dialogue Forum (2007). *New Delhi ministerial communiqué*. New Delhi: Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
- IBSA Dialogue Forum (2010), *The future of agricultural co-operation in India, Brazil and South Africa*, 15 April (tabled at the VI IBSA Trilateral Commission). Downloaded from [The_future_of_agricultural_co-operation.pdf](#), accessed on 27 August 2010.
- ICONE (2005): *Field survey report: Brazil. South-South economic cooperation: Exploring IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) initiative*. São Paulo: ICONE (mimeo.).
- Jaffrelot, Christophe and Cynthia Schoch (2009). *Emerging states: the wellspring of a new world order*. New York: Columbia University Press/Paris: Centre d'Études et Recherches Internationales.
- Juma, Calestous, Cosmas Gitta, Allison DiSenso and Audette Bruce (2005). "Forging new technology alliances: the role of South-South cooperation." *Cooperation South 2005*: 59-71.
- Kappel, Robert (2010). *On the economics of regional powers: China, India, Brazil and South Africa* (GIGA Working Paper 145). Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies.
- Keet, Dot (2006a). "South-South" strategic challenges to the global economic system and power regime. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue (also published by Transnational Institute, Amsterdam).
- Keet, Dot (2006b). *Southern African development co-operation: overview of regional cooperation and development – alternative possibilities and counter-tendencies, problems and challenges*. Cape Town: Alternative Information and Development Centre.
- Kulkarni, P. (2005). *Field survey report: India. South-South Economic Cooperation: Exploring IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) initiative*. (mimeo.).
- Kumar, N. and Ramgopal Agarwala (2006): *Seizing new opportunities for South-South cooperation: some proposals for the 14th NAM Summit*. New Delhi (RIS Policy Briefs 26). New Delhi: Research and Information System for Developing Countries.
- Kumar, Rajiv. 2010. *A development agenda for G20: an Indian perspective*. New Delhi: Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations.
- Langhammer, Rolf J. (1988). "Developing countries' manufactured exports and South-South trade in primary interdependencies." Pp. 614-41 in: Singer, Hans W., N. Hatti, and R. Tandon (eds). *Challenges of South-South co-operation*. New Delhi: Ashish.
- Lechini de Alvarez, Gladys (1995). *Las relaciones Argentina-Sudáfrica desde el proceso hasta Menem*. Rosario: Ediciones CERIR.
- Lechini de Alvarez, Gladys (2003). "South-South co-operation in the new international scenarios: the case of Argentina and Brazil's foreign relations toward Africa and South Africa." *UNISA Latin America Report* 19 (2): 17-22.
- Lechini de Alvarez, Gladys (2007). "Middle powers: IBSA and the new South-South co-operation." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 40 (8): 28-32.
- Maag, Isabelle (2005). *Brazil's foreign economic policy: South-South, North-South or both?* Geneva: Friederich Ebert Stiftung.

- McDonald, Scott and Dirk Willenbockel (2008). "India, Brazil, China and South Africa: is the South big enough?" Paper presented to the 11th Annual Congress on Global Economic Analysis, Helsinki, June.
- Miller, Darlene (2005). "South Africa and the IBSA initiative: constraints and challenges." *Africa Insight* 35, pp. 52-57.
- Mildner, S.-A. and J. Husar (2007). *Indien, Brasilien und Südafrika in der Doha-Runde: Handelspolitische Interessen und Entscheidungsstrukturen* (SWP Diskussionspapier, Oktober 2007). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
- Nayyar, Deepak (2008). *China, India, Brazil and South Africa: engines of economic growth?* Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University.
- New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)(2005). *Africa's science and technology consolidated plan of Action*. August. Available at http://www.nepadst.org/doclibrary/pdfs/doc27_082005.pdf, downloaded 8 January 2008.
- Nunes de Oliveira, Amâncio Jorge, Janina Onuki and Emmanuel de Oliveira (2006). "Coalizões Sul-Sul e multilateralismo: Brasil, Índia e África do Sul." *Contexto Internacional* 28 (2): 465-504.
- Özkan, Mehmet (2006). "A new approach to global security: pivotal middle powers and global politics." *Perceptions* (Spring): 77-95.
- Pal, Satyabrata (2006). "Perspective from the government of India: statement to the colloquium on IBSA at the University of South Africa." *UNISA Latin America Report* 22 (1 & 2): 127-130.
- Peoples' Dialogue (2006). *Regional integration in South America: background and perspectives*. Rio de Janeiro: People's Dialogue.
- Prashad, Vijay (2007). *The darker nations: a biography of the short-lived Third World*. New Delhi: Leftword.
- Puri, Lakshmi (2007). *IBSA: An emerging trinity in the new geography of international trade* (UNCTAD Policy issues in international trade and commodities, Study Series 39). New York and Geneva: United Nations.
- Ray, Amit Shovon and Fábio Villares (2006). *India, Brazil and South Africa: perspectives and alliances*. São Paulo: Instituto de Estudos Econômicos e Internacionais /Editora UNESP.
- Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS)(2005): *India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) economic cooperation: towards an action programme*. New Delhi: RIS.
- Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS)(2007) *Trinity of the South: Potential of IBSA partnership*. New Delhi: Academic Foundation.
- Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) and India, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) (2007). *IBSA: globalization, emerging powers and the media: report of the conference of editors from India, Brazil and South Africa*. New Delhi: RIS and MEA.
- Roelofse-Campbell, Zélia (2003). "Brazil and the creation of the IBSA Dialogue Forum (the G3)." *UNISA Latin America Report* 19(2): 23-28.
- Roelofse-Campbell, Zélia (2006). "Post-apartheid South Africa and Brazil: a strategic partnership." *UNISA Latin America Report* 22 (1 & 2):92-107.
- Sandrey, R. and H. Jensen. (2007). *Examining the India, Brazil and South African triangular trading relationship* (TRALAC, Working Paper No 1/2007). Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa.
- Santos Paulinho, Amelia Uliafnova and Guang Hua Wan (2010). *Southern engines of global growth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scoones, Ian (2006). *Contentious politics, contentious knowledges: mobilising against GM crops in India, South Africa and Brazil*. Brighton: University of Sussex. Institute of Development Studies.

- Sengupta, Dipanker and Pritam Banerjee (2004). "India and global economic governance: the search for an appropriate coalition." Paper presented at a workshop on the IBSA Dialogue, Global Governance and Development, Johannesburg, 5-6 July.
- Sequeira, Vikrum Aaron (2008). An examination of the India-Brazil-South Africa alliance. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Texas at Austin.
- Singer, Hans W., N. Hatti and R. Tandon (1988). *Challenges of South-South co-operation*. New Delhi: Ashish.
- Soares de Lima, Maria Regina (2004). "Brazil's international profile and the challenges of South-South co-operation." Paper presented at a workshop on the IBSA Dialogue, Global Governance and Development, Johannesburg, 5-6 July.
- Soares de Lima, Maria Regina (2005). "A política externa Brasileira e os desafios da cooperação Sul-Sul." *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 48 (1): 24-59.
- Soares de Lima, Maria Regina and Monica Hirst (2006). "Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities." *International Affairs* 82 (1): 21-40.
- Soko, Mills (2006). *South-South economic co-operation: the India-Brazil-South Africa case* (Trade Policy Report 12). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Sombra Saraiva, José Flávio (1997) "A comparative analysis of the foreign policies of South Africa and Brazil." *UNISA Latin American Report* 13 (2): 27-34.
- Spektor, Matias (2009). *Brazil as a regional and emerging global power* (SAIIA Emerging Powers Programme, Policy Briefing 9). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Taylor, Ian (2005). *Africa and the emerging new trade geography: the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum and its implications for global governance* (Working Paper Series 7). Manchester: Centre for International Politics, University of Manchester.
- Taylor, Ian (2009). "'The South will rise again'? New alliances and global [governance](#): the India-Brazil-South Africa dialogue forum." *Politikon* 36 (1): 45-58.
- Vaz, Alcides Costa (2006). *Intermediate states, regional leadership and security: India, Brazil and South Africa*. Brasilia: UnB Press.
- Vieira, Marco (2009). "Two worlds apart? Reconciling the regional and the trilateral in the foreign policies of India, Brazil and South Africa." Paper presented at the 50th annual convention of the International Studies Association, New York City.
- Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007) "Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification." *Third World Quarterly*, 28 (7): 1309–26.
- Vilalva, Mário and Irene Vida Gala (2003). "Brazil-South African relations: four decades towards the affirmation of a democratic partnership." *UNISA Latin America Report* 19 (1): 4-21.
- Villares, Fábio *et al.* (2006). *India, Brazil and South Africa : perspectives and alliances*. São Paulo: Instituto de Estudos Econômicos e Internacionais/Editora UNESP.
- White (Lyal) (2004a). "IBSA: South-South co-operation with a difference." *Global Insight* 36, August: 1-4.
- White, Lyal (2004b). "South Atlantic relations: from bilateral trade relations to multilateral coalition building." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17 (3): 523-537.
- White, Lyal (2006). "IBSA: A state of the art." Paper presented at Universidad de San Andrés conference "Los poderes emergentes y la seguridad regional: el caso IBSA", Buenos Aires, 30 May.
- White, Lyal (2009). *IBSA six years on: co-operation in a new global order* (SAIIA Emerging Powers Programme, Policy Briefing 2). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.

- White, Lyal and Tatiana Cyro Costa (2009). *Biofuel technology transfer in IBSA: Lessons for South Africa and Brazil* (SAIIA Emerging Powers Programme, Policy Briefing 7). Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- White, Lyal and Natasha Skidmore (2004). "The metamorphosis of the butterfly: from South-South trade strategy to trilateral coalition building." Pp. 159-169 in: *The South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2003/4*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Wilson, D. and R. Purushothaman (2003): *Dreaming with BRICs: the path to 2050* (Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper 99). New York: Goldman Sachs.
- Yadav, S N and Indu Baghel (2010). *Brazil, India and South Africa : trilateral cooperation for democracy and development*. New Delhi: Jnanada Prakashan assisted by Text Book Promotion Society of India.

APPENDIX 2

Independence for key countries of the global South, 1946-2002

Year	Country	Former colonial ruler
1946	Philippines	USA
	Lebanon, Syria	France
	Jordan	Britain
1947	India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka	Britain
1948	Israel, Myanmar	Britain
1949	Indonesia	Netherlands
	Laos	France
1951	Libya	Italy
	Oman	Britain
1953	Cambodia	France
1954	Vietnam	France
1956	Sudan	Britain, Egypt
	Morocco, Tunisia	France
1957	Ghana, Malaysia	Britain
1960	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo	France
	Nigeria	Britain
	Congo-Kinshasa	Belgium
	Somalia	Italy, Britain
1961	Sierra Leone, Tanzania	Britain
1962	Rwanda, Burundi	Belgium
	Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Uganda	Britain
	Algeria	France
1963	Kenya	Britain
1964	Malawi, Zambia	Britain
1965	Gambia, Maldives	Britain
	Singapore	Malaysia
1966	Barbados, Botswana, Guyana, Lesotho	Britain
1967	South Yemen	Britain

1968	Mauritius, Swaziland	Britain
	Equatorial Guinea	Spain
1971	Bangla Desh	Pakistan
	Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates	Britain
1973	Bahamas	Britain
1974	Guinea-Bissau	Portugal
1975	Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, São Tomé & Príncipe	Portugal
	Suriname	Netherlands
	Papua New Guinea	Australia
1977	Djibouti	France
1980	Zimbabwe	Britain
1981	Belize	Britain
1990	Namibia	South Africa
1993	Eritrea	Ethiopia
2002	Timor Leste	Portugal, Indonesia